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This article discusses the status of animal rights, and more particularly 
whether these rights may be defended from a natural rights perspective 
or from an ethical perspective. I argue that both options fail. The same 
analysis applies in the case of mankind. ‘Mankind’ does not bring with it 
the acknowledgement such rights, nor does a focus on what is arguably 
characteristic of mankind, namely, reason. Reason is decisive, though, 
in another respect, namely, the fact that reasonable beings can claim 
and lay down rights. It does not follow from this that animals should 
have no rights, since human beings may be motivated to constitute such 
rights, while this provides the most solid basis for them.
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Introduction
In the wake of an ever stronger relativization of the differences be-
tween human beings and (other) animals, it has become increasingly 
diffi cult to separate a domain of rights to which only human beings 
should be entitled. It seems diffi cult to deny that human rights should 
be acknowledged without also granting the relevant rights to animals, 
‘relevant’ indicating that some rights, such as the right to vote, are of 
no use to them. Indeed, if one seeks to take a moral stance, this distinc-
tion has come under pressure. It is possible to focus on what presum-
ably uniquely characterizes mankind, namely, reason, but it remains 
to be seen whether this position is tenable.
In section 1, I present an important argument for those who plead 
acknowledging rights for animals, or, similarly, treating animals well 
on the basis of moral considerations, namely, the argument from mar-
ginal cases, after which I indicate why focusing on mankind as such, 
i.e., without it being clear which criterion or criteria would purportedly 
warrant a special treatment, is a cul-de-sac.
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Section 2 presents reason as a potential candidate. Kant’s view of 
practical reason as a special faculty is contrasted with an account of 
reason that does not treat it as something the existence of which eo 
ipso warrants a certain treatment for those endowed with it, but starts 
from the more realistic and better supportable perspective that reason 
is simply a faculty that cannot be ignored when granting rights is con-
cerned. The interests of human beings must be taken to heart (by those 
same human beings) since not doing so would either be inconsistent or 
unfeasible, or both.
The third section discusses the consequences of this outlook, taking 
into consideration alternatives such as Singer’s. A position that starts 
from moral dictates is not outright dismissed, but such dictates cannot 
be decisive as long as it is unclear how they might motivate actions.
1. Animals vis-à-vis human beings
The issue of whether animals are entitled to a certain treatment on 
the basis of the acknowledgment of animal rights or moral consider-
ations is an important one, which has been answered in the affi rmative 
by many, from diverse considerations. There are differences of opinion 
whether animal rights or rather animal interests should be the focus of 
attention, but this is in fact a minor issue as long as their arguments 
to promote these rights or interests stem from the same motivation for 
the reason that those who plead animal interests would, presumably, 
want to transpose those interests into rights. The crucial issue would 
then be whether things like (natural) rights may be said to exist irre-
spective of their being realized through a process of legislation. While 
those who focus on animal interests are not plagued by the justifi cation 
problem of proving that such rights exist, at least if their claim is that 
animal interests consist in something that can be demonstrated rela-
tively easily, such as their suffering being ended or prevented, they, 
too, face the burden of proving on what foundation a moral appeal to 
those who might remove such suffering should be based. I will return 
to this issue below.
In any event, if one starts from a moral appeal, the argument from 
marginal cases (Narveson 1977: 164), meaning that the dividing line 
between animals on the one hand and cognitively impaired people (and 
maybe children) on the other cannot consistently be maintained, those 
clinging to it being accused of ‘speciesism’, seems diffi cult to dispel:
[…] those who think moral status does depend on capacity X are forced to 
draw one of two conclusions. Either they will have to admit that marginal 
humans do not have moral status because they do not have capacity X. Or if 
they wish to maintain that marginal humans have moral status they must 
admit that it depends on something other than capacity X. If this something 
else is a feature which animals share it must be admitted that animals have 
moral status too. (Tanner 2005: 53, 54)
There appear to be three options. It may be argued, fi rst, that hu-
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mans have natural rights (or moral status) while animals do not; sec-
ond, that both humans and animals have such rights; and third, that 
none have such rights. Those who take the argument from marginal 
cases seriously would not prefer the second option to the fi rst, but it 
does not follow from that given that the third option should not be pre-
ferred to both. Indeed, there are reasons to consider it the superior 
alternative, which are persuasive enough to do so, as I will argue.
A strategy to remedy this problem may be to shift the focus from 
the individual to the species to which it belongs, which includes even 
individuals who have lost the presumably relevant characteristic or 
have never had it to begin with. Kateb maintains such a position, by 
distinguishing between the status of individuals and the stature of the 
human race (Kateb 2011: 6). Human dignity is defended by Kateb by 
pointing to both aspects (Kateb 2011: 9). No human beings are thus ex-
cluded, providing Kateb with the opportunity to state: “There are people 
who are so disabled that they cannot function. Does the idea of dignity 
apply to them? Yes, they remain human beings in the most important 
respect. If they cannot actively exercise many or any of their rights they 
nevertheless retain a right to life, whatever their incapacities (short of 
the most extreme failures of functioning).” (Kateb 2011: 19).
The diffi culties become apparent from the following:
I am not saying that when we regard any particular individual we should 
see in him or her an embodiment or personifi cation of the whole human 
record, and by that conceit infl ate the person into the species, or even allow 
the full range of demonstrated human capacity to bestow its aura on any 
given human being or on all human beings equally. No, we deal here with 
the stature of the species, carrying with it a past that grew out of other spe-
cies and will be extended indefi nitely into the future. But the fact remains 
that every individual has all the uniquely human traits and attributes that 
the human record shows. The human record shows and will show, however, 
a cumulative display of these traits and attributes that surpasses any indi-
vidual and any particular group or society. (Kateb 2011: 125–126) 
The issue resulting from the argument from marginal cases is not, 
then, resolved by Kateb.1
Even if the argument from marginal cases is disregarded (if only 
arguendo), those who argue that special moral duties should apply in 
the case of human beings compared to animals may not, or at least not 
yet, consider their distinction justifi ed, for they are still faced with the 
burden to prove, fi rst, what makes human beings special, i.e., what 
quality or qualities single them out, and, second, why such a quality 
or qualities should be suffi cient reason to be treated in a special way. 
In the next section, I will discuss a candidate that has often been prof-
fered: reason.
1 Besson’s position is equally void: “[…] human rights are universal moral rights 
of a special intensity that belong to all human beings by virtue of their humanity. 
Human rights are universal moral rights because the interests they protect belong 
to all human beings.” (Besson 2013: 97).
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2. The import of reason
Reason seems to be the only quality that can consistently be presented 
as the relevantly distinguishing one between animals and human be-
ings. Kant is perhaps the most important promoter of such a position. It 
must be said that Kant does not consider understanding, or reasoning 
power, the decisive feature: for him, ‘reason’ in the sense of practical 
reason is what distinguishes man in the decisive respect from animal; 
understanding does lead to a difference, but this is a relative differ-
ence (Kant 1903 [1785]: 434–436; Kant 1907 [1797]: 435, 436), which 
is primarily important in private law. The role of practical reason be-
comes clear from Kant’s remark that one is to be considered an end in 
itself on the basis of being autonomous (Kant 1908 [1788]: 87),2 which 
is (supposedly) possible in the domain that one cannot reach on the ba-
sis of—theoretical—reason (e.g. Kant 1911 [1781/1787]: A 532 ff./B 560 
ff., A 702/B 730, A 800 ff./B 828 ff). (Since this limitation is in place, I 
say ‘supposedly’.) So the understanding (or reasoning power) does not 
constitute the decisive ground for man to be considered an end in itself; 
a being rather has ‘dignity’ on the basis of its capacity to act morally 
(Kant 1903 [1785]: 435). Autonomy is the basis of the ‘dignity’ of man, 
and of every reasonable creature (or ‘nature’, in Kant’s words).3
Rather than elaborate on the problems involved with Kant’s defense 
of practical reason in particular, I will focus on what is decisive for the 
present discussion, which is the issue of the connection between being 
endowed with reason (or another quality) and being treated in a special 
way.
Such a connection is not evident. For example, it may be argued 
that those who are endowed with reason and who are in addition espe-
cially intelligent may use their abilities to display skills where others 
are unable to do so, resulting in, for example, different incomes, but 
that situation must not be confused with the present one, which is con-
cerned with the question of whether different treatment should follow 
from the quality eo ipso, and on what such a connection would be based, 
if anything, is unclear.
McGinn rightly adduces the contingent factors that have led to hu-
man domination over animals while not being dominated by other be-
ings (McGinn 1993: 147–149), but while this may necessitate a reas-
sessment of mankind’s special position vis-à-vis animals, or at least 
some of them, it is not clear why a moral obligation towards such be-
2 Elsewhere, Kant defi nes autonomy (of the will) as “the quality of the will by 
which it is a law to itself (independently of any quality of the objects of volition).” 
(“[…] die Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch derselbe ihm selbst (unabhängig von 
aller Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände des Wollens) ein Gesetz ist.”) (Kant 1903 
[1785]: 440).
3 “Autonomy is the basis of the dignity of human and every reasonable nature.” 
(“Autonomie ist […] der Grund der Würde der menschlichen und jeder vernünftigen 
Natur.”) (Kant 1903 [1785]: 436).
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ings would follow from that consideration. Self-interest may provide a 
more compelling foundation here: one imagines oneself oppressed and 
would want to avoid certain experiences that accompany such a situ-
ation. In practical terms, this may alter some of mankind’s relations 
with (some) animals, as will be indicated in section 3, but that does not 
touch upon the present issue of the supposedly moral foundation.
Jamieson’s position is similarly problematic. He says: “[…] the com-
munity of equals is the moral community within which certain basic 
moral principles govern our relations with each other; and these moral 
principles include the right to life and the protection of individual lib-
erty.” (Jamieson 1993: 224). A community of equals may be defended: 
different beings should be treated equally, at least in some respects, 
on account of the fact that their differences should be considered ir-
relevant. The step from that given to a supposedly ‘moral community’, 
however, is in need of justifi cation. By contrast, if the appeal to equal 
treatment may be based on self-interest, no such elements need to be 
added.
The same consideration applies to what Regan4 and Francione5 ob-
serve. As is clear from these quotes, the present considerations apply 
irrespective of whether one starts from a rights-based approach or from 
an interests-based one. In both cases, a moral criterion is put forward 
as decisive, without indicating what this means, let alone on what this 
would supposedly be based. The fi rst part—i.e., what this means—may 
be said to be clear: isn’t it morally right to keep other beings, among 
which animals, from suffering? To this I would respond that one may at 
best appeal to something as vague as an ‘intuition’; perhaps more trou-
bling, moral appeals may simply be dismissed, as no means to enforce 
such appeals are available lest those appeals not be moral, of course: it 
is in the nature of such appeals that one should not act upon them from 
exterior considerations.6 What an alternative, ‘interior’ appeal, perhaps 
4 “It is […] the capacity to suffer itself that seems to provide the only adequate 
grounds for attributing the right in question to those humans, including morons, to 
whom we wish to attribute it. It is because, like us, morons can suffer, that they, 
like us, seem to have as much claim as we do to the right not to be made to do so 
gratuitously.” (Regan 1977: 186).
5 “[…] if we are to make good on our claim to take animal interests seriously, 
then we can do so only one way: by applying the principle of equal consideration—
the rule that we ought to treat like cases alike unless there is a good reason not to 
do so—to animals. The principle of equal consideration is a necessary component of 
every moral theory. […] Although there may be many differences between humans 
and animals, there is at least one important similarity that we all already recognize: 
our shared capacity to suffer.” (Francione 2004: 121).
6 As Kant says: “Insofar the laws of freedom only refer to purely external actions 
and their conformity to the law, they are called juridical; do they also demand that 
they should themselves be the determining principles of the actions, they are ethical; 
and then one says: the conformity to the former is the legality of the action, while the 
conformity to the latter is its morality.” (“So fern [die Gesetze der Freiheit] nur auf bloße 
äußere Handlungen und deren Gesetzmäßigkeit gehen, heißen sie juridisch; fordern 
sie aber auch, daß sie (die Gesetze) selbst die Bestimmungsgründe der Handlungen 
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doing the right thing ‘for its own sake’, may mean I do not profess to 
know, and remains, I would add, a source of confusion and obscurity. 
The alternative to argue from self-interest appears to provide a more 
solid ground to reach the same effects.
This alternative leaves room to distinguish between human beings 
and animals in some important respects. Reason is, in this approach, 
the decisive factor, although reason is not a decisive moral character-
istic, as it is with Kant. It is rather the feature that makes it possible 
to realize an outcome effi ciently, the outcome in the present case being 
the alleviation of one’s own suffering, and that of other beings, if one 
has an interest to do so. Crucially, reason is not only the faculty on the 
basis of which one recognizes that suffering must be alleviated (and the 
fact that such suffering may in fact remain to a great extent takes away 
nothing from that observation), but it is arguably simultaneously the 
decisive characteristic to be granted certain rights, on account of two, 
possibly related considerations.
First, those who have reason would, if they were oppressed by oth-
ers (who themselves act on the basis of reason, oppressing those oth-
ers out of an interest, such as an economic interest7), have an interest 
to rise up against their oppressors, which may result in upheaval or 
even a civil war. This is suffi cient reason for those in power not to op-
press others. Slavery was admittedly not abolished in the USA because 
slaves themselves protested against their treatment, but black people 
still being treated unequally with white people thereafter, to which 
they responded with nonviolent and violent protests, did contribute to 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The policies of segregation that had been 
installed had been shown to have become corrupted, since it had be-
come clear that black people were powerful and endowed with reason, 
both characteristics being intertwined in the sense that pure physical 
power would not have been suffi cient, as some animals are far more 
powerful than any human being, while this is apparently no reason to 
grant them any rights. Before black people had the resolute to stand 
up for themselves or were simply not in a position to be able to do so, 
they were not treated equally. It might have been possible to leave the 
policies resisting equal treatment in place, as similar policies would 
remain in place in South Africa, but that might have resulted, in the 
worst case, in civil war.8
sein sollen, so sind sie ethisch, und alsdann sagt man: die Übereinstimmung mit den 
ersteren ist die Legalität, die mit den zweiten die Moralität der Handlung.”) (Kant 
1907 [1797]: 214; cf. pp. 219, 225).
7 This is no academic issue, as slavery is an important historical institution, 
having been abolished in the U.S.A. as recently as 1865, while black people were 
oppressed until far into the 20th century.
8 I do not discuss here the criticism from other countries (such criticism being 
directed, incidentally, at South Africa in the 20th century, of course). After all, the 
fact that they would protest the policies would merely shift the question and would 
not provide an answer to the fundamental question that would still remain, namely, 
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Second, for those who have reason to claim certain rights on that ba-
sis—in this case from the consideration that reason would eo ipso be the 
relevant moral characteristic to be granted such rights while excluding 
other beings lacking such a characteristic—would mean their contradict-
ing themselves. This is suffi cient to counter Singer’s remark that reason 
(or rationality) would be an arbitrary characteristic (Singer 2011: 50). 
It may be considered thus in moral terms, but I have already addressed 
that option, not starting from any supposedly moral characteristic.
I mentioned that these considerations are possibly related. By this 
I mean to say that they may together constitute the most plausible 
explanation in indicating why reason is the crucial factor. It does not 
by itself command respect for those who are able to act on it, unless re-
spect is taken to mean simply that those who are endowed with reason 
cannot be overpowered, at least not easily. ‘Power’ has a broad meaning 
here, for those who are physically handicapped or weak are relevant 
beings, just as those who are potentially rational9 (most children) or 
fi ctitiously so (the mentally handicapped, including extreme cases such 
as anencephalic children). In the latter case, of course, the power is 
vicarious in the sense that the power of those that protect them is what 
is decisive; the protection need not be provided by individuals (such as 
the parents of mentally handicapped or even ‘normal’ children), since 
on the basis of the foregoing analysis anyone may be said to have an 
interest in protecting them, so that it would be provided collectively.
This argument may be leveled against those who present the argu-
ment from marginal cases. It must be granted that the fi ctitious cases 
can be extended to include animals; whether the same consideration 
may in future times apply to the case of potentially rational beings I 
cannot say—if certain animals should at some point become (poten-
tially) rational, what is argued here applies to them for that reason. In-
cidentally, reason is not to be equated with intelligence, since a certain 
degree of intelligence is suffi cient to constitute reason and thus being 
eligible to the right under discussion—the right to be treated equally, 
which not only prohibits discrimination but protects citizens, or, more 
generally, legal subjects, against being killed, while various degrees of 
intelligence may lead to being treated justifi ably differently in some 
cases; for instance, those who have an above average intelligence can, 
ceteris paribus, earn more money than those that have an average or 
below-average intelligence.
Applying the fi ction not only to mentally handicapped people but 
to animals, too, is certainly possible (if only because a fi ction does not 
refer to a real state of affairs but is, ex natura rei, a product of one’s own 
making), but apart from cases such as one’s affection to a pet it would 
why those countries that oppose the policies would do so, and not implement them 
themselves, instead of acknowledging equal treatment as they have done.
9 ‘Reason’ and ‘rationality’ are identifi ed here. They may mean many things, but 
I will not needlessly complicate matters.
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be diffi cult to see what would be a consideration here, while in the case 
of mentally handicapped people, such a consideration is evident:
While species, as such, has nothing to do with the case at the level of foun-
dations, there are reasons of a straightforward kind for extending the ambit 
of morality to infants and morons, etc. We want to extend it to children 
because most of us want to have our own children protected, etc., and have 
really nothing to gain from being permitted to invade the children of oth-
ers; we have an interest in the children of others being properly cared for, 
because we don’t want them growing up to be criminals or delinquents, etc. 
(and we do want them to be interesting and useful people). And we shall 
want the feeble-minded generally respected because we ourselves might 
become so, as well as out of respect for their rational relatives who have a 
sentimental interest in these cases. (Narveson 1977: 177)
Only those who believe in reincarnation may be motivated to apply the 
fi ction more broadly than this. A similar stance is presented by Posner: 
“It is because we are humans that we put humans fi rst. If we were cats, 
we would put cats fi rst, regardless of what philosophers might tell us. 
Reason doesn’t enter.” (Posner 2004: 67)
Since reason is both the characteristic of those who may decide to 
treat beings in a certain way and the characteristic they consider cru-
cial (on the basis of self-interest, if I am correct), reason is signifi cant 
in two respects. First, it is what the beings who are able to assert rights 
share in common (which is an actual given, so that this may be called 
‘factual equality’, and more specifi cally ‘basic equality’, in order to spec-
ify the decisive characteristic, which is reason, so that basic equality 
may in turn be specifi ed by ‘basic rationality’), and, second, it is the 
characteristic that is decisive in determining the extent of equal treat-
ment (which may be called ‘prescriptive equality’). So the same beings 
that are able to decide which beings should be treated equally are those 
to whom equal treatment is applied. Singer seems to overlook the fact 
that these two levels must both be acknowledged.10 He says: “Equality 
is a basic ethical principle, not an assertion of fact.” (Singer 2011: 20). 
Yet a little further on, when the prescriptive level is addressed, he ob-
serves: “The essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests 
is that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like in-
terests of all those affected by our actions.” (Singer 2011: 20). After all, 
this means that ‘equality’ is not only used at the prescriptive stage, but 
has a descriptive component: ‘all those affected’ are apparently (in the 
relevant respect or respects) equal, in order to be considered for equal 
treatment. When Singer subsequently states “What the principle really 
amounts to is: an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest it may be.” 
(Singer 2011: 20), this still presupposes (basic) equality. It just means 
that one abstracts from all traits save the ability to suffer.
10 I do not mean to say by this that reason must also necessarily be the decisive 
element, since I may simply be mistaken, but rather the fact that a descriptive level 
must be in place before certain behavior is prescribed. Incidentally, in my alternative, 
prescription does not imply moral prescription, or normativity in that sense.
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I will readily grant that mine is a ‘minimalistic’ position, and that 
only the necessary conditions for such beings to live peacefully together 
have been outlined; one may argue that (some of) the obligations to-
wards reasonable beings should also apply to beings that lack reason. 
This will be discussed in the next section.
3. A realistic perspective
In the previous section, I argued that reason is the feature on the basis 
of which rights should be granted, and that this feature has also been 
decisive in realizing legislation to grant and protect rights. This ac-
counts for the different treatment of animals and human beings, the 
fi rst not being protected in the most basic sense of being killed.11 For 
example, I know of no instance in which killing a mosquito is punish-
able. (Those who consider this example misleading on account of the 
fact that mosquitoes may be a nuisance or even harmful may exchange 
it for another animal, to which this does not apply.) Still, it seems I 
have overlooked an important issue. Is the reason why some animals 
may be killed or even treated cruelly while others should be left un-
harmed not simply that the fi rst kind does not suffer, lacking a cen-
tral nervous system, so that the issue of harming them would be moot 
in the fi rst place? Perhaps, but that merely specifi es the question: do 
those animals which are capable of experiencing harm have natural 
rights or moral status?
It may be useful to fi rst consider the position of human beings. ‘Man-
kind’, or ‘humanity’, is arguably an invention, a notion to encompass all 
human beings (without it being always clear what it means to qualify 
as a human being), so as to reach a stage where divisive characteristics, 
such as religion, race or gender, are not decisive to be granted certain 
rights.12 There does not seem to be a compelling reason, prior to this 
invention, for those in power to extend the rights to those not in power, 
and it is not surprising to fi nd such changes realized only (shortly) af-
11 There are, admittedly, some exceptions to this rule, laws being in place that 
protect animals from being treated cruelly, but, fi rst, a lesser sentence applies in 
being cruel towards an animal than in being cruel towards a human being (ceteris 
paribus), and, second, such legislation is arguably drafted with the interests of 
human beings in mind (for example, the owners of pets or farm animals, who have 
an interest in their being protected). The German Constitution provides a clear 
example from another perspective. Article 20a starts thus: “Der Staat schützt auch 
in Verantwortung für die künftigen Generationen die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen 
und die Tiere…” (“The state protects, mindful also of its responsibility towards future 
generations, the natural foundations of life and animals…”) Animals are obviously 
(at least partly) considered as means (for future human beings).
12 While homo sapiens is a species (with the subspecies homo sapiens sapiens), 
determined on the basis of biological criteria, ‘mankind’ (or ‘man’, or ‘humanity’) has 
become an honorifi c in law. Biology describes the characteristics of human beings 
while law prescribes that human beings should be treated in a certain way. Still, the 
link between being a (human) being and being treated in some way is not evident 
and, not coincidentally, construed by human beings themselves.
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ter the power balance has shifted. In the cases where this was not, or 
not necessarily, a consideration, such as in the case of the abolition of 
slavery in the USA, it is clear that one would act inconsistently by al-
lowing conditions one would not oneself fi nd acceptable or agreeable to 
live under to apply to other beings that are not in the crucial respect or 
respects different from oneself. In the case of black people being held 
as slaves, this situation is clear once one realizes that they are rational 
beings (in the sense of basically rational indicated in the previous sec-
tion) just as white people are, and that this would be suffi cient to grant 
them the same rights they—i.e., the white people—have established for 
themselves. The same consideration applies, mutatis mutandis, to the 
extension of suffrage to women, one’s gender now acknowledged not to 
be a relevant characteristic here.
The foregoing analysis does not point to any moral elements, and 
both the original allotment and the extension of rights may more con-
vincingly be argued to be based on self-interest. ‘Humanity’ is not, then, 
something special on the basis of which rights should be granted or one 
should be treated in some ‘morally acceptable’ way. In fact, ‘humanity’ 
is such a general, and even vague, word that it hardly has a meaning, 
or if it has one, it may be linked to, ironically, arbitrary traits, such as 
the human body; the diffi culties a position such as Kateb’s faces13 were 
indicated in section 1, while reason is not really the decisive charac-
teristic, since mentally handicapped people are fi ctitiously considered 
to be reasonable beings, simply because it would apparently be unwel-
come or unacceptable not to do so and to treat them as things. It is clear 
that such a course of action does not constitute a refl ection of reality 
but is rather a moral appeal or a political solution, while I have argued 
that the former, a moral appeal, is not decisive here.
Those who defend animal rights,14 or moral treatment of animals 
(e.g. Singer 2011: 50), would further abstract and might use ‘animality’ 
instead of ‘humanity’. Depending on how one deals with matters such as 
the argument from marginal cases discussed above, ‘animality’ would 
be more consistent than ‘humanity’ (because of the fact just mentioned, 
that a characteristic such as the human body is obviously no serious 
candidate to be used as a criterion for some treatment), and in that 
respect Singer’s contribution is valuable. This still raises the question, 
though, why one should take the interests of animals to heart. Singer 
maintains: “If a being suffers, there can be no moral justifi cation for 
refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the 
nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that the suffering 
be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough compari-
13 Kateb (rightly) dismisses a focus on bodily traits (2011: 133), but does not 
prevent a viable alternative.
14 E.g. Donaldson and Kymlicka 2014: 25: “The basic premise of ART [animal 
rights theory] is that whenever we encounter […] vulnerable selves—whenever we 
encounter ‘someone home’—they need protection through the principle of inviolability, 
which provides a protective shield of basic rights around every individual.”
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sons can be made—of any other being.” (Singer 2011: 50). What he says 
is perfectly understandable, but being capable of suffering is merely a 
criterion to determine whether interests may be relevant: those who 
may suffer have an interest not to. It does not necessitate those who 
understand this given to abstain from causing their suffering, or to 
alleviate it. This given does not, in other words, entail the motivation 
to act in accordance with it. This motivation is clear in the case of hu-
man beings: allowing harmful behavior would be undesirable as one 
might oneself fall victim to it and in the most extreme scenario, living 
together peacefully might cease to be possible.
Supposed animal rights, prior to their being included in man-made 
law, are no more and no less diffi cult to substantiate than supposed hu-
man rights, and an appeal to acknowledge animal rights on the basis of 
the fact that human rights exist is nothing other than the extension of 
a starting point that has not been justifi ed itself.15
The foregoing does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that hu-
man beings should be allowed to do with animals whatever they want, 
animals being treated as things in this regard. What was decisive before 
in forestalling animal rights or some treatment on the basis of suppos-
edly moral considerations, namely self-interest, may now be appealed 
to in order to prevent this outcome. Self-interest in a narrow sense may 
not reach this result, for if ‘self’ is taken to refer only to the person who 
acts, it may be in one’s interest, e.g., to eat meat, while some may even 
have an urge to harm animals for their enjoyment, the fulfi llment of 
which would confl ict with laws forbidding such behavior. ‘Self-interest’ 
may, however, alternatively be taken to extend to a greater domain of 
subjects, and if animals are considered to be such subjects, there would 
be suffi cient reason to take their interest into consideration.
This use of ‘self-interest’ may be considered a rhetorical trick, sim-
ply utilizing a defi nition of my own making to reach an outcome that is 
counter-intuitive. This line of reasoning is not, however, as strange as 
it may be taken to be. In fact, what has already been said does not de-
viate from it. I have already pointed out in section 2 that the fi ction of 
rationality is applied to children, ‘normal’ children being potentially ra-
tional, and may be extended to some animals (such as pets) on the basis 
of the same consideration why it applies to children for some people.16 I 
would argue that ‘indirect self-interest’ is at stake in cases where one’s 
own interest (i.e., ‘direct self-interest’) is not an issue, while the inter-
est of another being one seeks to serve is relevant, experiencing some 
15 Cf. Bentham (1843: 500): “How stands the truth of things? That there are no 
such things as natural rights—no such things as rights anterior to the establishment 
of government—no such things as natural rights opposed to, in contradiction to, 
legal: that the expression is merely fi gurative; that when used, in the moment you 
attempt to give it a literal meaning it leads to error, and to that sort of error that 
leads to mischief—to the extremity of mischief.”
16 I say ‘for some people’ because other considerations, discussed in section 2, may 
be decisive for all people, including those who do not themselves have children.
48 J. Doomen, Of Mosquitoes and Men
bond with that being.17 Parents make certain, sometimes great, sacri-
fi ces for their children. (This consideration applies a fortiori to some 
animal species, although this may be fully contributed to instinctual 
factors.) Some people may experience a bond with their pets similar to 
that of children. This does not warrant the same treatment that applies 
to children (as other considerations apply to the case of children), but it 
does provide an argument to take their interests seriously.
The foregoing gives rise to two problems. First, a ‘popularity con-
test’ may ensue: the cutest or cuddliest animals should be treated well, 
while other animals, which do not incite feelings of affection, should 
continue to be treated as mere things. Second, a demarcation line be-
tween various sorts of animals seems diffi cult to draw. Perhaps dogs 
should be protected from harm, but what about, perhaps in descending 
order of importance, a seagull, a mosquito or an ant?18 (I have already 
remarked that the nuisance or harm some animals themselves pro-
duce may be a relevant factor.) Both issues may be dealt with from the 
perspective of those who decide which rights should be granted, and to 
which beings. Those who make such decisions are those who are basi-
cally equal, and, more specifi cally, basically rational; their interests 
may, as was indicated, follow from the idea of indirect self-interest. 
One may on that basis, for example, distinguish between domesticated 
and non-domesticated animals: “What distinguishes DAs [domesticat-
ed animals] from other animals is that we humans have brought them 
into our society.” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2014: 204). However, Don-
aldson and Kymlicka qualify the relationship in terms of duties and the 
extension of citizenship (to the domesticated animals) (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2014: 204, 205), and even remark: “[…] domestication makes 
the extension of citizenship both morally necessary and practically fea-
sible.” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2014: 205). The latter—the practical 
feasibility—is defensible, but the substantiation for the former—the 
moral necessity—is not provided, and may not be forthcoming as the 
burden of proof may be too great.
In practical terms, no great differences need arise between my posi-
tion and one that starts from moral appeals, and animals themselves 
will, presumably, not care on what basis they are treated in some way. 
In both cases, legislation may be implemented on the basis of which 
animals, or at least some animals, are protected. The underpinnings of 
such legislation are wanting, however, in the latter case, which is an 
important reason to exchange it for a more viable alternative, such as 
the one I have defended.
An approach such as this does not solve the problems mentioned 
above, and may not even confront others that have remained undis-
17 The demarcation line between direct and indirect self-interest is diffi cult to 
draw. I will not explore that issue here.
18 Taking the interests—or supposed interests—of the latter animals seriously 
would effectively mean resorting to actions such as those performed by Jains, such 
as sweeping the ground before walking on it.
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cussed here, but the alternative of clinging to moral terms without 
their meaning having become apparent, let alone how they might com-
pel one to act in one way rather than another is less appealing. Should 
the role of such terms become clear at some point, I would be willing 
to substitute this alternative for my own position, but it seems safe to 
say that, at least for now, such a skeptical—or pragmatic—stance is 
the most acceptable, to which I would add that the desire to be able to 
make a moral appeal on the basis of natural rights is not the same as 
the proof of their existence.19 The same reasoning applies to a moral 
appeal.20 If people are motivated, on the basis of indirect self-interest, 
to end the suffering of (some) animals, it will not be a problem to real-
ize legislation that protects their interests, and such legislation will in 
that case even be desirable.
Conclusion
It is diffi cult to maintain that human beings should be granted the 
most important rights while these should be withheld from animals if 
one bases one’s claim on an account of natural rights or on an ethical 
theory. It does not follow from this discrepancy, however, that animal 
rights must be acknowledged, as human rights have been acknowl-
edged, for such a basis for human rights is wanting, their defenders’ 
accounts. Arguing that animal rights should be acknowledged as natu-
ral rights would only compound to the justifi cation problems natural 
rights theorists and ethicists face. Still, concluding from this that the 
opposite result should follow, and that animals should not be protected 
in any way, attests to an obvious false dilemma, since a third option is 
available. I have defended such an option, maintaining that rights are 
generally realized on the basis of self-interest, in the broad sense of 
indirect self-interest, and that the protection such rights provide may 
be extended to include (some) animals. The practical results need not 
signifi cantly differ from those reached on the basis of an approach such 
as Singer’s, but their foundation is arguably more stable, self-interest 
providing a more solid starting point than a moral appeal.
19 Cf. Bentham (1843: 501): “In proportion to the want of happiness resulting 
from the want of rights, a reason exists for wishing that there were such things as 
rights. But reasons for wishing there were such things as rights, are not rights;—a 
reason for wishing that a certain right were established, is not that right—want is 
not supply—hunger is not bread.”
20 Bentham is known for his focus on suffering, relativizing in light of the fact 
that (some) animals share this ability with human beings the other characteristics 
(i.e., reason and the—related—ability to speak) that distinguish them (Bentham 
1843 [1789]: 143, Ch. 19), but this may also be construed as a demonstration of 
what consequences would follow from a consistent line of reasoning. Bentham’s 
straightforward outlook and his view on morals invite such an interpretation: “The 
whole difference between politics and morals is this: the one directs the operations 
of governments, the other directs the operations of individuals; their common object 
is happiness.” (Bentham 1843 [1789]: 12, Ch. 2).
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